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NOTES
NO FAULT EQUITABLE SUBORDINATION: REASSURING
INVESTORS THAT ONLY GOVERNMENT PENALTY
CLAIMS ARE AT RISK
The bankruptcy courts have the power to subordinate claims on
equitable grounds,' which means that they may place an otherwise
superior, valid claim behind other claims in the name of equity 2
Congress codified the judicially created doctrine of equitable subordination in the Bankruptcy Act of 19781 but did not provide
guidelines for application of the doctrine. Instead, Congress left
the development of the doctrine to the courts.4 The danger of
judges' arbitrarily applying such a harsh remedy has caused the
financial community to study carefully the developments of the
law of equitable subordination. 5 The fear of unpredictable subordination was, for the most part, alleviated by the requirement of the
Bankruptcy Act of 19786 that subordination occur only if the
claimant acted inequitably I This doctrine assured investors that,
absent such inequitable conduct, their priority was secure. Recent
cases that have defied existing precedent by subordinating valid
1. See, e.g., Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939); see also infra notes 28-101 and accompanying text (describing the common law development of equitable subordination).
2. 3 COLLIER ON BANKRupTcy § 510.01 (15th ed. 1992).
3. 11 U.S.C. § 510(c)(1) (1988).
4. Id. ("It is intended that the term 'principles of equitable subordination' follow existing
case law and leave to the courts development of this principle."); see La Grand Steel Prods.
Co. v. Goldberg (In re Poole, McGonigle & Dick, Inc.), 796 F.2d 318, 322 (9th Cir.), modified, 804 F.2d 576 (9th Cir. 1988) ("Section 510(c), permitting a bankruptcy court equitably
to subordinate claims is essentially a codification of case law."); see also COLLIER, supra note
2, § 510.04; infra note 104 and accompanying text (presenting the testimony in Congress of
Rep. Edwards, the bill's sponsor).
5. Andrew DeNatale & Prudence B. Abram, The Doctrineof EquitableSubordination as
Applied to Nonmanagement Creditors, 40 Bus. LAW. 417, 417 (1985).
6. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330
(1988)).
7. Benjamin v. Diamond (In re Mobile Steel Co.), 563 F.2d 692, 699-700 (5th Cir. 1977);
see also infra note 77 and accompanying text (describing the impact of Mobile Steel).
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claims without a finding of creditor misconduct have shaken the
financial community and called into question the future of bankruptcy priority s
During a 1991 meeting of the American Bar Association Business
Law Section, Martin Bienenstock, an attorney with the law firm of
Weil, Gotshal & Manges, noted "a new chill in the air" from recent
federal circuit cases that could signal "a trend toward no fault subordination."9 Mr. Bienenstock warned that although the cases had
involved Internal Revenue Service (IRS) claims, the courts had
subordinated the government claims even though no IRS misconduct had taken place. 10 He stated that "the potential consequences
are enormous," and "[t]he message is that perhaps lenders can be
subordinated without being guilty of anything whatsoever, but
solely because the court thinks their claims should be treated on a
lesser basis than other creditors' claims.""
Mr. Bienenstock's concern was the result of recent cases that involved subordinated nonpecuniary tax claims without a finding of
misconduct on the part of the claimant. In 1990, the Seventh Circuit decided In re Virtual Network Services Corp.," holding that a
court could subordinate a claim without a finding of misconduct. 3
The Eighth Circuit 4 and the Third Circuit 5 quickly adopted the
reasoning of the Virtual Network decision.
Mr. Bienenstock's statements reflected practitioners' fears that
the equitable powers of the courts, unrestrained by the common
law's requirement of a finding of misconduct, will eclipse the structure of bankruptcy prioritization." The question of "which claims
should be on a parity with which other claims will be a function of
7
first impression with every judge.'

8. MARK BUNDITZ, THE LAW OF LENDER LIABILITY § 7-4 (Supp. 1991).

9. Recent Circuit Rulings Signal Move to 'No Fault Subordination,' ABA Told, Bankr.
L. Daily (BNA) 474, 475 (Apr. 26, 1991) [hereinafter Recent Rulings]; see also Secured
Lenders Can Lose Place in Line, WALL ST. J., June 20, 1991, at B8.
10. Recent Rulings, supra note 9, at 475.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id.
902 F.2d 1246 (7th Cir. 1990).
Id. at 1250.
Schultz Broadway Inn v. United States, 912 F.2d 230 (8th Cir. 1990).
In re Burden, 917 F.2d 115 (3d Cir. 1990).
Recent Rulings, supra note 9, at 475.

Id.
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Unbridled equitable power implies that lenders will be unable to
assess risk. At the heart of the Bankruptcy Code lies the importance of predicting the order of claims when a company becomes
bankrupt; Congress intended stability before, during, and after a
bankruptcy ' 8 Existing precedent allows lenders to determine the
scope of permissible conduct and avoid subordination by staying
within these bounds. 9 The recent trend of increased lender liability 20 has helped create a distrust of the legal system within the

financial community Increasing the exposure of lenders by eroding
the requirement of inequitable conduct will only increase lenders'
distrust by threatening the security they currently have.
This Note analyzes the development of the doctrine of equitable
subordination, first in common law, then in statutory law The
common law development of equitable subordination was rooted in
cases that involved misconduct . 2 1 As the principle evolved, courts
adopted a three-part test to determine when subordination was
proper; 21 one part of the test was a requirement that misconduct
exist before subordination could occur. 23 The Bankruptcy Code
codified the common law, including the requirement of misconduct.24 Unfortunately, some ambiguity in the legislative history of
the Bankruptcy Code could be construed to allow subordination
without a finding of misconduct. 25 Virtual Network Services Corp.
v. United States26 was the first case in which a court utilized the
legislative ambiguity to subordinate in the absence of misconduct.2 7 The Note concludes that Virtual Network is an anathema
that courts should confine to its precise facts.

18. See, e.g., Charles Seligson, Preferences Under the Bankruptcy Act, 15 VAND. L. REv.
115 (1961) (stating that the goal of bankruptcy law is that all creditors similarly situated
should be treated alike). See generally COLLIER, supra note 2, § 501.01 (discussing the
Bankruptcy Code's provisions).
19. See infra note 77 and accompanying text.
20. See infra note 234.
21. See infra notes 32-69 and accompanying text.
22. Id.
23. See infra note 37 and accompanying text.
24. See infra note 104 and accompanying text.
25. See infra note 107 and accompanying text.
26. 98 B.R. 343 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989), afl'd, 902 F.2d 1246 (7th Cir. 1990).
27. See infra notes 114-71 and accompanying text.
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EQUITABLE SUBORDINATION

The Common Law
The bankruptcy court traditionally has been described as a multifaceted court with legal and equitable power. 2s The court's equity

jurisdiction is rooted in the central theme of the bankruptcy

laws-equality of distribution.2" When the substantive laws of
bankruptcy fail to achieve just results, bankruptcy courts invoke
equity to allow substance to prevail over form.30 The courts' desire
to achieve just results, and the equitable powers that sanctioned
this pursuit, led the courts to develop the doctrine of equitable
subordination. The doctrine of equitable subordination first appeared as an equitable defense to the allowance of claims.3 '
"Deep Rock"
The Supreme Court first validated the bankruptcy courts' equitable power to subordinate claims in Taylor v. Standard Gas &
Electric Co.,3 2 popularly known as the "Deep Rock" case. 33 In Taylor, the preferred stockholders of the Deep Rock Oil Corporation
protested a claim against Deep Rock by its parent company, Standard Gas & Electric, that resulted from loans Standard had made

28. See Bank of Marn v. England, 385 U.S. 99, 103 (1966) ("There is an overriding consideration that equitable principles govern the exercise of bankruptcy jurisdiction."); Heiser
v. Woodruff, 327 U.S. 726, 732 (1946) (setting out the law and equity elements of a bankruptcy court's jurisdiction); Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 240 (1934) (analyzing the
Code's grant of law and equity jurisdiction to bankruptcy courts). The bankruptcy court has
always had equitable jurisdiction. HELEN D. CHAITMAN, THE LAW OF LENDER LIABILITY 7.02
(1990) (discussing 11 U.S.C. §§ 11(a)(2), 93(k) (repealed 1978)).
29. Sampsell v. Imperial Paper & Color Corp., 313 U.S. 215, 219 (1941); Clarke v. Rogers,
228 U.S. 534, 548 (1913). The goal of the Bankruptcy Code is for each creditor to receive a
per centum distribution equal to the per centum distribution received by others of equal
status. Prudence Realization Corp. v. Geist, 316 U.S. 89, 93 (1942).
30. See, e.g., Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 305 (1939) (invoking equitable power "to the
end that fraud will not prevail, that substance will not give way to form, that technical
considerations will not prevent substantial justice from being done").
31. See id. at 312; DeNatale & Abram, supra note 5, at 421.
32. 306 U.S. 307, 323 (1939).
33. At least one commentator has referred to a court's adjustment of creditors' claims
based on equitable principles as "Deep Rock[ing]" in recognition of the Taylor opinion.
John S. Cullina, Note, RecharacterizingInsiderPreferencesAs FraudulentConveyances: A
Different View of Levit v. Ingersoll Rand, 77 VA. L. REV. 149, 181 n.153 (1991).
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to Deep Rock. 34 The stockholders attempted to subordinate Standard's claim pursuant to section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act of
1898, which allowed for reorganization " 'includ[ing] provisions
modifying or altering the rights of stockholders generally, or of any
class of them, either through the issuance of new securities of any
character or otherwise.' "I' The Court found that Standard had
mismanaged and undercapitalized Deep Rock and had denied the
preferred stockholders voting power to which they were entitled. 6
Because of Standard's inequitable conduct, the Court subordinated
Standard's claim, 37 recognizing that returning the preferred shareholders to the position that they had occupied prior to Standard's
mismanagement was impossible.3 8 Instead, the Court guaranteed
that the preferred stoqkholders would receive a right in the company's equity superior to Standard's, as well as a voice in managerial decisions equal to or greater than Standard's. 9 By demanding
that these steps be taken if reorganization were to occur, the Court
eliminated the preferred shareholders' subordinated status that
had caused the mismanagement.
Pepper v. Litton
The Supreme Court clarified the scope of Taylor in Pepper v.
Litton,4" decided the same year. In Pepper, Litton, the dominant
and controlling stockholder of the Dixie Splint Coal Company,
caused Dixie to confess judgment for unpaid salary claims that Litton intended to use as a shield against debts that the corporation
41
owed to a creditor, Pepper, for royalties due through a lease.
When Pepper asserted his claim against Dixie, Litton forced the
company to file a voluntary petition in bankruptcy 42 Litton be34. Taylor, 306 U.S. at 309-12.
35. Id. at 322-23 (quoting § 77B(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544
(codified at 11 U.S.C. § 77B(b)(2) (1934) (repealed 1978))).
36. Id. at 323.

37. Id. at 324.
38. Id. at 323 ("It is impossible to recast Deep Rock's history and experience so as even to
approximate what would be its financial condition at this day had it been adequately capitalized and independently managed
").

39. Id. at 324.
40. 308 U.S. 295 (1939).
41. Id. at 297.
42. Id. at 298.
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lieved that the company's confessed judgment would consume its
remaining assets, leaving nothing for Pepper.4 3
The Court clarified the basis of its decision in Taylor by stating
that the holding in that case "was based on the equities of the
case," 44 thus eliminating claims that the "Deep Rock" doctrine derived statutorily from section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898,
or that it was limited to enterprise liability 45 The Court explained
that a bankruptcy court has the power to examine claims in two
ways. First, it can determine whether a claim is valid; if it decides
that the claim is not valid, the court can disallow it. 46 Second, even
if the claim is valid, the bankruptcy court can look behind the
form of the claim because a "bankruptcy court has the power to
sift the circumstances surrounding any claim to see that injustice
or unfairness is not done in administration of the bankrupt estate. '47 Litton's claim passed the first test of validity because he
had secured a judgment, but his claim failed the second test because he had acted inequitably in securing the judgment. 48 The
Court viewed this abuse of Litton's insider status as a violation of
his fiduciary duty and held that Litton's inequitable conduct not
only allowed, but required, the bankruptcy court to exercise its equitable powers by subordinating the claim.49
Comstock v. Group of Instttutional Investors
Comstock v. Group of Instttutional Investors," the third in the
trilogy of cases 5 1 forming the fundamental doctrine of equitable
subordination, involved the reorganization of a railroad company
Comstock, an investor, objected to a claim by Missouri Pacific
Railway Company against one of its subsidiaries, the New Orleans
43. Id.
44. Id. at 308. The Court stated that the inequity was a result of "the history of spoliation, mismanagement and faithless stewardship
by [the subordinated claimant]." Id.
45. DeNatale & Abrams, supra note 5, at 421.
46. See Pepper, 308 U.S. at 305-06.
47. Id. at 308.
48. Id. at 310-12.
49. Id. at 312.
50. 335 U.S. 211 (1948).
51. The characterization of the cases as a trilogy or the "big three," and the use of the
term "Taylor-Pepper-Comstock," appeared in Asa S. Herzog & Joel B. Zweibel, The Equitable Subordinationof Claims in Bankruptcy, 15 VAND. L. REV. 83, 108, 111 (1961).
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Railway Company 5 2 Comstock argued that Missouri Pacific, the
controlling shareholder of New Orleans Railway, had mismanaged
the subsidiary and caused it to operate with unfair advantage to
Missouri Pacific. 3 Comstock did not question the facial validity of
the debt-the first prong of the Pepper test;54 instead, he attacked
Missouri Pacific's claim on the grounds that the circumstances surrounding the claim warranted the subordination of the claim to
Comstock's capital stock-the second55 prong of the Pepper test. 6
Although both Taylor and Comstock involved reorganization
under section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, and the plaintiffs
in both cases made similar allegations, the Court distinguished
Comstock on the grounds that Missouri Pacific had acted in good
faith. 57 The Court explained that the purpose of the rule in Taylor
was
to prevent a fiduciary m such a position from enriching itself by
breach of its trust. It is not mere existence of an opportunity to
do wrong that brings the rule into play; it is the unconscionable
use of the opportunity afforded by the domination to advantage
that deprives the wrongdoer
itself at the injury of the subsidiary
58
of the fruits of his wrong.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Murphy argued that the Court
should not confine the doctrine of equitable subordination to matters of bad faith. 9 He read Pepper as allowing subordination when
negligence and the "utmost subjective good faith" created inequity 60 The Court rejected Justice Murphy's broad reading.6 '
Where Pepper expanded Taylor by giving the bankruptcy courts
broad use of their equitable powers, Comstock narrowed the use of
these powers by imposing a requirement that courts find bad faith

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Comstock, 335 U.S. at 214.
Id. at 217.
See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
Comstock, 355 U.S. at 219.
See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
Comstock, 335 U.S. at 229.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 238 (Murphy, J., dissenting).

60. Id.
61. Id. at 230-31 ("Disallowance of petitioner's objections on such findings [of good faith]
was not error of law.").
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before they order subordination. Commentators have construed
Comstock as "a reminder to the bankruptcy court that although it
is a court of equity, it is not free to adjust the legally valid claim of
an innocent party who asserts the claim in good faith merely be6' 2
cause the court perceives that the result is inequitable.
Despite the clarity of Comstock, some viewed the principles of
the Taylor-Pepper-Comstock trilogy as ambiguous. An article written twelve years after Comstock pointed out some of the weaknesses of these cases. 63 For example, the basis of the Court's deci-

sion in Pepper may have been fraudulent conduct.6 4 If this
interpretation is accurate, then much of Justice Douglas' opinion
was dicta. Pepper thus only exacerbated the ambiguity of the
Taylor opinion's use of the word "injustice" by categorizing the
breach of moral obligations of the fiduciary as "unjust. 6 5 Finally,
the fact that Justice Douglas, the author of Pepper, dissented in
Comstock diminishes the importance of Comstock.6 Because of
these weaknesses, commentators have argued that the Taylor-Pepper-Comstock trilogy merely gave the bankruptcy court three ex'67
amples of how to define "injustice.

Despite this criticism, a majority of courts seized the holdings in
these three cases as basic guidelines for determining when subordination was proper. 6 The focus of the litigation that followed the
cases became the degree of offending conduct that was necessary to
trigger the possibility of subordination. Apparently, the Supreme
62. DeNatale & Abram, supra note 5, at 428 (citation omitted).
63. Herzog & Zweibel, supra note 51, at 107.
64. See id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 108 (stating that the disagreement in Comstock reflected a different interpretation of facts, not principles of law).
67. Id.
68. See tnfra notes 71-78 and accompanying text (describing the adoption of the framework of Benjamin v. Diamond (In re Mobile Steel Co.), 563 F.2d 692 (5th Cir. 1977)).
69. See, e.g., Smith v. Associated Commercial Corp. (In re Clark Pipe & Supply Co.), 893
F.2d 693 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding equitable subordination improper when a creditor reduced
funding and exercised powers pursuant to a loan agreement negotiated prior to insolvency).
The determination is highly fact specific and often turns on the creditor's control over the
debtor and the disposition of assets. Id. at 701. The level of conduct that the courts will
deem inequitable varies with the position of the claimant; the party seeking to subordinate
the claim bears a lesser burden if the creditor is an insider than if the creditor is not an
insider.
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The primary distinctions between subordinating the claims of insiders versus
those of non-insiders lie in the severity of misconduct required to be shown,
and the degree to which the court will scrutinize the claimant's actions toward
the debtor or its creditors. Where the claimant is a non-insider, egregious conduct must be proven with particularity. It is insufficient for the objectant in
such cases merely to establish sharp dealing; rather, he must prove that the
claimant is guilty of gross misconduct tantamount to "fraud, overreaching or
spoliation to the detriment of others." Where the claimant is an insider, his
dealings with the debtor will be subjected to more exacting scrutiny. If the
objectant comes forward with sufficient substantiations of misconduct on the
part of the insider claimant, the burden will shift to the insider to establish
that each of his challenged transactions with the debtor had all the earmarks
of an arm's length bargain.
In re Pacific Express, Inc., 69 B.R. 112, 116 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1986) (quoting In re Teltronics
Servs., Inc., 29 B.R. 139, 169 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983)).
Section 101(31) of the Bankruptcy Code reads in part:
"insider" includes(B) if the debtor is a corporation(i) director of the debtor;
(ii) officer of the debtor;
(iii) person in control of the debtor;
(iv) partnerslp in which the debtor is a general partner;
(v) general partner of the debtor; or
(vi) relative of a general partner, director, officer, or person in control of the
debtor;
(E) affiliate, or insider of an affiliate as if such affiliate were the debtor;
11 U.S.C. § 101(31)(1988). Section 102(3) provides that the use of the word "includes" is not
limiting in its effect. Id. § 102(3). The categories of § 101(31), therefore, are not exhaustive
and an entity that does not fit neatly into any of the categories may nonetheless be an
insider if it exerts sufficient influence over the debtor. See, e.g., Highway & City Freight
Drivers v. Gordon, 576 F.2d 1285 (8th Cir. 1978).
Some writers argue that, on one hand, the equitable subordination remedy demands flexibility and the imprecision allows courts to fashion appropriate relief. DeNatale and Abram
explain:
Inasmuch as the thrust of the doctrine is to correct the results of inequitable or
fraudulent conduct not otherwise voided by the express provisions of the bankruptcy laws, any attempt to establish precise criteria for the application of the
doctrine would result in permitting certain inequitable or fraudulent conduct
to escape its reach and would defeat the very purpose of the doctrine.
DeNatale & Abram, supra note 5, at 422. The uncertainties and risks of commercial financing, on the other hand, could be reduced if courts offered corporate creditors more concrete
guidance. One definition of inequitable conduct has been lauded in the literature and
quoted by the courts:
Inequitable conduct is that conduct which may be lawful, yet shocks one's
good conscience. It means, inter alia, a secret or open fraud; lack of faith or
guardianship by a fiduciary; an unjust enrichment, not enrichment by bon
chance, astuteness, or business acumen, but enrichment through another's loss
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Court had answered affirmatively the question of whether subordi0
nation required bad faith.7
For many years after the Comstock decision, courts continued to
struggle to define the amorphous concepts that comprised the doctrine of equitable subordination. An overwhelming number of
courts followed the Supreme Court and required that some type of
inequitable conduct exist before subordinating a legitimate claim.71
The Supreme Court left each court to determine exactly what the
phrase "good faith"72 meant. Markedly absent was a framework to
assist courts in uniformly applying the principles of equitable
subordination.
In re Mobile Steel Co.
In 1977, the Fifth Circuit, after a thorough review of prior decisions, distilled the requirements for equitable subordination into
three criteria:

brought about by one's own unconscionable, unjust, unfair, close, or doubledealing or foul conduct.
In re Harvest Milling Co., 221 F Supp. 836, 838 (D. Or. 1963).
70. All but one case until 1978 explicitly required inequitable conduct for the subordination of a creditor's claim. See In re Burden, 917 F.2d 115, 122 (3d Cir. 1990) (Alito, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (pointing out that opinions written in 1990 could
find only one pre-1978 case, Jezarian v. Raichle (In re Stirling Homex Corp.), 579 F.2d 206
(2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1074 (1979), that permitted subordination without
explicitly requiring inequitable conduct). See infra notes 80-100 and accompanying text for
a discussion of Homex.
71. See, e.g., Heiser v. Woodruff, 327 U.S. 726 (1946) (holding a bankruptcy court has the
authority to subordinate a creditor's clain based on a showing of fraudulent or inequitable
conduct); Wood v. Richmond (In re Branding Iron Steak House), 536 F.2d 299 (9th Cir.
1976) (holding that equitable subordination requires a showing of "suspicious" inequitable
conduct of a corporate officer accused of undercapitalization of a bankrupt corporation);
Stebbins v. Crocker Citizens Nat'l Bank (In re Ahlswede), 516 F.2d 784 (9th Cir.) (finding
that a bankruptcy court lacked the authority to subordinate a claim without evidence of
inequitable conduct by a trustee), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 913 (1975); In re Credit Indus.
Corp., 366 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1966) (holding that equitable subordination is based on a showing of inequitable conduct); Costello v. Fazio, 256 F.2d 903 (9th Cir. 1958) (finding that the
evidence did not support a claim of inequitable conduct when corporate officers converted
partnership contributions into loans that left the partnership undercapitalized); Luther v.
United States (In re Garden Grain & Seed Co.), 225 F.2d 495 (10th Cir. 1954) (holding that
subordination is inappropriate without a finding of inequitable conduct); In re Elkins-Dell
Mfg. Co., 253 F Supp. 864 (E.D. Pa. 1966) (holding that convincing proof of unconscionable
conduct is necessary to warrant equitable subordination).
72. See Comstock v. Group of Investors, 335 U.S. 211, 228-29 (1948).
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(1) The claimant must have engaged m some type of inequitable
conduct.
(2) The misconduct must have resulted in injury to the creditors
of the bankrupt or conferred an unfair advantage on the

claimant.
(3) Equitable subordination of the claim must not be inconsis3
tent with the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act.
74
Although aware of the article by Herzog and Zweibe1 that deem75 the court cited Comstock
phasized the importance of Comstock,
as authority for the first two conditions.7 6 Courts and commentators quickly seized upon the new framework as a pragmatic solution to the ambiguity that plagued the doctrine of equitable subordination. 7 In 1985 the law seemed to be settled:

73. Benjamin v. Diamond (In re Mobile Steel Co.), 563 F.2d 692, 700 (5th Cir. 1977).
Courts have emphasized the danger posed by a judge's decision to deviate from these strict
guidelines and instead act on personal opinions of justice and morality. See, e.g., Boyajarian
v. Defuses (In re Giorgio), 862 F.2d 933, 939 (1st Cir. 1988).
74. Herzog & Zweibel, supra note 51.
75. Mobile Steel, 563 F.2d at 699 (citing Herzog & Zweibel, supra note 51).
76. Id. at 699-700.
77. See Smith v. Associated Commercial Corp. (In re Clark Pipe & Supply Co.), 893 F.2d
693, 699 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that evidence of inequitable conduct by a lender was sufficient to justify equitable subordination); Spacek v. Thomen (In re Universal Farming Indus.), 873 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that subordination would be denied absent
harm to other creditors); Bergquist v. Anderson-Greenwood Aviation Corp. (In re Bellanca
Aircraft Corp.), 850 F.2d 1275, 1282 (8th Cir. 1988) (applying Mobile Steel's three-part
test); Estes v. N & D Properties, Inc. (In re N & D Properties, Inc.), 799 F.2d 726, 731 (11th
Cir. 1986) (explicitly adopting Mobile Steel's three-part test); La Grand Steel Prods. Co. v.
Goldberg (In re Poole, McGonigle & Dick, Inc.), 796 F.2d 318, 323 (9th Cir.) (holding that a
stockholder's claim would be subordinated based on evidence that its repurchase agreement
would harm the general creditors), modified, 804 F.2d 576 (9th Cir. 1986); Unsecured Creditors Comm. of Pacific Express, Inc. v. Pioneer Commercial Funding Corp. (In re Pacific
Express, Inc.), 69 B.R. 112, 116 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1986) (applying the Mobile Steel test); Katz
v. Department of Justice (In re Belluci), 29 B.R. 814, 815 (Bankr. 1st Cir. 1983) (holding
that § 510(c)(1) will not subordinate an IRS claim to the claims of a debtor's defrauded
clients); Wilson v. Huffman (In re Missionary Baptist Found.), 712 F.2d 206, 211-12 (5th
Cir. 1983) (holding that a bankruptcy judge must provide clear factual reasoning in order to
subordinate a claim under Mobile Steel); Trone v. Smith (In re Westgate-California Corp.),
642 F.2d 1174, 1178 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that actions by an individual against a bankrupt entity that would have been litigated would not justify subordination because subordination would be punitive); In re Thomas, 91 B.R. 731, 737 (N.D. Tex. 1988) (holding § 510
inapplicable because the IRS's failure to refer a dispute between government agencies to the
U.S. Attorney's office did not constitute wrongful conduct); In re Powe, 75 B.R. 387, 389-90
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1987) (holding § 510 inapplicable because no evidence showed that the
IRS had engaged in inequitable conduct); In re Campton Corp., 40 B.R. 875, 877 (Bankr.
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Although the doctrine appears to have been utilized with greater
frequency recently, the doctrine of equitable subordination itself
has not changed significantly in the last forty years. Indeed, the
simple and well stated principles of equity jurisprudence set
forth by the Supreme Court in Pepper v. Litton continue to be
as relevant and valid today as they were over forty years ago.
[The Mobile Steel] criteria are not new but are merely a
restatement of the elements of the doctrine. It would appear
that there has not in fact been any expansion of the doctrine by
78
the courts.

In re Stirling Homex
One other case, Jezarian v. Raichle (In re Stirling Homex
Corp.),79 sets the background for the current controversy that surrounds the doctrine of equitable subordination. Homex is recognized as the lone case prior to the passage of the Bankruptcy Code

N.D. Tex. 1984) (holding that a U.S. Department of Energy claim that was not based on
pecuniary loss, and that was not likely to be returned to actual injured parties, was property
subordinated); In re Graft Bros., Inc., 38 B.R. 237, 238 (Bankr. D. Me. 1984) (holding that
Congress' failure to provide a highway use tax did not constitute inequitable conduct under
§ 510); In re Roamer Linen Supply, Inc., 30 B.R. 932, 937 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983) (holding
that § 510(c)(1) does not provide a basis for subordinating pecuniary tax liens); Regro Crescent Corp. v. Tymon (In re Regro Crescent Corp.), 7 C.B.C.2d 713, 717 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
1982) (holding that prepetition debts from shareholder loans to a debtor shall be subordinated only by proving that the corporation was undercapitalized prior to the loan or that
shareholder conduct was inequitable); Allied Tech., Inc., v. R.B. Bruneman & Sons, Inc. (In
re Allied Tech., Inc.), 25 B.R. 482, 499 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982) (holding that claims arising
under an assumption of a lease would not be subordinated under § 510(c)(1) because the
lease benefitted the deceased's estate and thus the other secured creditors); George Ashe,
Subordination of Claims-Equitable Principles Applied in Bankruptcy, 84 BANKING L.J.
778, 780 (1967); Helen D. Chaitman, The Equitable Subordination of Bank Claims, 39 Bus.
LAW. 1561, 1562 (1984) (discussing subordination of bank claims); DeNatale & Abram, supra
note 5, at 418; Margaret H. Douglas-Hamilton, Creditor Liabilities Resulting from Improper Interference with the Management of a Financially Troubled Debtor, 31 Bus. LAW.
343, 343 (1975); Herzog & Zweibel, supra note 51, at 108-11; Jeremy W Dickens, Note,
Equitable Subordination and Analogous Theories of Lender Liability: Toward a New
Model of "Control," 65 TEx. L. Rav. 801 (1987) (analyzing lender liability and equitable
subordination contexts); W Clark Watson, Note, Deep Rock in the Deep South-Equitable
Subordination of Claims in Fifth Circuit Bankruptcy Proceedings, 11 CuMB. L. R.v. 619,
620 (1980).
78. DeNatale & Abram, supra note 5, at 447.
79. 579 F.2d 206 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1074 (1979).
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that subordinated creditors' claims without making an express
finding of inequitable conduct."0
In Homex, key officials of the company seeking reorganization
engaged in fraudulent conduct intended to mislead the public into
believing that the company was financially stable when it was
not."' In distributing the company's assets, the bankruptcy judge
subordinated the claims of the "allegedly defrauded stockholders"8 to those of the company's general unsecured creditors. s The
stockholders sought classification of their claims based not on their
interest in the company, as evinced by stock certificates, but on
their claims against the company that alleged fraud. s4 The court
gave the following logic for its decision to subordinate the claims:
If the claims of alleged defrauded stockholders are not subordinated to the claims of conventional general unsecured creditors,
a wholly new element will have been created in the financial
structure of business. No longer will creditors, whether banks,
suppliers, or subcontractors, be free as they now are to extend
credit to the ordinary course of business on their presumed right
to be accorded priority over the claims of investors and speculators in securities
Such a fundamental change in the financial structure of the business community is unwarranted in the
absence of legislation designed to overturn the long established
rule of absolute priority.
Defrauded stockholder clannants m the purchase of stock are
presumed to have been bargaining
for equity type profits and
85
assumed equity type risks.

The bankruptcy court did not explicitly follow the Mobile Steel
framework in reaching its decision, probably because of the large
80. See supra note 70.

81. Homex, 579 F.2d at 208.
82. The court used this term throughout the opinion, perhaps because the shareholders
had not proven that the fraud had an effect on their transactions. The fact that five of the
officers of the~company were convicted of securities fraud, mail fraud, and conspiracy, id. at
209 n.4, may indicate that the court believed that the shareholders could not have been
completely oblivious and could not have had clean hands, and that they must have been
involved somehow in the impropriety.
83. Id. at 209-10.
84. Id. at 212.
85. Id. at 210 (citing the opinion of the bankruptcy court).
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body of existing case law that addressed the issue in Homex and
the important policy concerns.8
The Second Circuit affirmed the decision of the bankruptcy
judge, 7 citing Pepper v. Litton8 as a justification for the bankruptcy court's application of equitable subordination. 9 The appellate court did not have to justify the Homex opinion on the basis
of the equitable principles outlined in Pepper because a welldefined body of law was already available to deal with the Homex
type of case.90 In reorganization cases, courts take a suspicious
view of stockholders who attempt to assume the role of creditors.9
One can view the issue in these situations as one not of subordination, but of whether the courts should allow stockholders to
recharacterize their interests "in such a way as to achieve parity
with ordinary unsecured tort and contract claimants.

'9 2

The Ho-

mex opinion cited Collier's explanation that when the claims of
one group of unsecured creditors deserve priority, the creditors
"must be separately classified and accorded the priority to which
they are entitled."93 The bankruptcy court engaged in this unique
type of subordination. 4 Another view of the Homex opinion is that
the decision was one in which the bankruptcy court applied the
two-prong Pepper analysis, finding that the claims could possibly
fit within the legal definition of claims that deserve parity but that
86. See id. at 213-14 ("We will not allow stockholders whose claims are based solely on
the alleged fraud that took place
to deplete further the already meager pool of assets
presently available to the general creditors.").
87. Id. at 210.
88. 308 U.S. 295 (1939).
89. Homex, 579 F.2d at 212.
90. The reference to Pepper appears in Homex as a sanction of the lower court's use of
equitable principles to subordinate the claims of the shareholders. The appellate court used
phrases from Pepper to establish the broad scope of the powers available to the bankruptcy
court. Id. at 212; see supra notes 40-49 and accompanying text (discussing the broad language in Pepper).
91. See, e.g., Homex, 579 F.2d at 211.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 213 (citing 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 9.13, at 1620-21).
94. Although the court's action has been classified as subordination, a strong argument
can be made that the court was engaged in determining proper classification.The opinion
pointed to the fact that courts are beginning to use equity to determine whether claims
belong together or whether claims belonging together should be shifted due to inequitable
conduct. Id. at 212-13.
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equity mandated their subordination.9 5 In other words, the shareholders attempted to use a legal technicality, frowned on by the
bankruptcy court, to gain a larger share in the liquidation.9 6 The
court viewed this
subtle attempt to override the system as mequi97
table conduct.

Interestingly, the Second Circuit was aware of the ongoing legislative process involving the Bankruptcy Code at the time the decision in Homex was pending; the court cited two versions of the bill
as they appeared at that time.9 8 The House version addressed the
exact question confronted by the Homex opinion:
The court's power is broader than the general doctrine of equitable subordination, and encompasses subordination on any equitable grounds.
The general creditors have not had the potential benefit of the proceeds of the enterprise deriving from
ownership of securities and it is inequitable to permit shareholders that have had this potential benefit to shift the loss to general creditors. 99
These statements showed that the House believed that in cases involving shareholders who attempt to shift their status using tort
theories, the courts needed powers broader than the "general doctrine of equitable subordination."1 ' Congress later removed this
passage from the bill. 101
95. See supra notes 40-49 and accompanying text (discussing Pepper).
96. See In re Burden, 917 F.2d 115, 122 (3d Cir. 1990) (Alito, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).

97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Jezarian v. Raichle (In re Stirling Homex), 579 F.2d 206, 215 (2d Cir. 1978) (citing
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 359, 195 (1977)), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1074 (1979).
100. Id.
101. Virtual Network Servs. Corp. v. United States, 98 B.R. 343, 346 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1989), aff'd, 902 F.2d 1246 (7th Cir. 1990). It is possible that Congress did not want to make
such a broad expansion of the equitable powers. Instead, Congress could have recognized
that in the unique case of creditors attempting to shift the nature of their claims so as to be
in parity with the unsecured creditors, an expanded definition of inequitable conduct was
warranted. See In re Burden v. United States, 917 F.2d 115, 122-23 (3d Cir. 1990) (Alito, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (describing the suit by stockholders in Homex as
an attempt to gain priority that might warrant an incremental change to the scope of misconduct). Because of the strong policies against upsetting the expectations of the general
unsecured creditors, Congress may have felt that the extension of the doctrine of equitable
subordination into this area was warranted.
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Codification of Equitable Subordination
The controversy surrounding equitable subordination largely resulted from Congress' decision to codify the judicially created doctrine of equitable subordination.
Section 510 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 reads:
(c) Notwithstanding subsections (a) and (b) of this section, after notice and a hearing, the court may(1) under principles of equitable subordination, subordinate
for purposes of distribution all or part of an allowed claim to all
or part of another allowed claim or all or part of an allowed interest to all or part of another allowed interest; or
(2) order that any lien securing such a subordinated claim be
transferred to the estate. 10
Although the language appeared very broad on its face, Congress
attempted to clarify any ambiguity in the Code through its accom03
panying legislative statements.1

102. 11 U.S.C. § 510(c) (1988).
103. The weight that these statements deserve is unclear and this uncertainty only contributes to the difficulties surrounding the interpretation of legislative intent. Courts on
both sides of the issue of whether inequitable conduct is required to subordinate a claim
have referenced the statements and attacked their importance. See infra notes 118-65 and
accompanying text.
Especially troubling is the heightened controversy surrounding the passage of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978. Some have pointed out that the passage of the Bankruptcy Code is
unique. For example, Representative Edwards, the chairman of the subcommittee that introduced the House amendments, stated on September 28, 1978, "[This]
is the culmination of over 8 years' work by a congressional commission, two congressional committees, and
numerous outside groups." 124 CONG. REc. 32,392 (1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 6452. The amendment substantially reformed the bankruptcy laws for the first time in 40 years; however, only a few members of Congress were
involved in the final version of the bill, see Kenneth Klee, Legislative History of the New
Bankruptcy Law, 28 DEPAUL L. REV. 941, 941-57 (1979), as "eleventh-hour" hearings secured
passage of the Code and resulted in a document with compromises that had previously gone
unevaluated by Congress. See Frank R. Kennedy, Foreword:A Brief History of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, 58 N.C. L. REV. 667, 676-77 (1980). Compounding the complexity of
interpretation is the fact that no final report was ever issued on this section. See Patricia M.
Wald, Justice in the Ninety-fifth Congress: An Overview, 64 A.B.A. J. 1854, 1855 (1978).
Earlier committee reports therefore could not assess the language of § 510(c)(1) as ultimately enacted at that final congressional session, and members of Congress were forced to
rely extensively on Representative Edwards and Senator DeConcini, the sponsor and cosponsor of the House and Senate bills, respectively, to inform them of the numerous compromises recommended prior to final passage of the bill. Id.
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The following statements represented the drafters' attempts to
clarify the meaning of section 510:
Section 510(c)(1) of the House amendment represents a compromise between similar provisions in the House bill and Senate
amendment.
It is intended that the term "principlesof equitable subordination"follow existing case law and leave to the courts development of this principle. To date, under existing law, a
claim is generally subordinatedonly if the holder of such claim
is guilty of inequitableconduct, or the claim itself is of a status
susceptible to subordination,such as a penalty or a claim for
damages arisingfrom the purchase or sale of a security of the
debtor The fact that such a claim may be secured is of no consequence to the issue of subordination. However, it is inconceivable that the status of a clain as a secured claim could ever be
grounds for justifying equitable subordination.104
The drafters also stated:
Having completed a general description of the amendment the
provisions of the House amendment which deal directly with, or
affect, the payment or collection of taxes in cases under title 11
will be discussed in detail.
Since the House amendment authorizes subordination of
claims only under principles of equitable subordination, and
thus incorporates principles of existing case law, a tax claim
105
would rarely be subordinatedunder this provision of the bill.
These statements, identical in both the House and the Senate, provided the tinder that ignited the controversy now surrounding equitable subordination of nonpecuniary tax claims.

104. 124 CONG. REC. 32,398 (statement of Rep. Edwards) (emphasis added), reprintedin
1978 U.S.C.C-A.N. 5787, 6452; see also td. at 33,998 (statement of Sen. DeConcini) (mirrormg
Rep. Edwards' statements), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.CAN. at 6521.
105. Id. at 32,412, 32,416 (statement of Rep. Edwards) (emphasis added), reprinted in
1978 U.S.C.CA.N. at 6488, 6499. As originally introduced, the bill provided that a tax clam
may not be subordinated on equitable grounds. See infra note 144 and accompanying text.
The bill eventually deleted this expression but its sponsors indicated that the effect would
be the same. 124 CONG. REc. 32,416 (statement of Rep. Edwards), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6498.
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At first impression, Congress' intent appears clear-the courts
should follow existing case law, including the prerequisite of inequitable conduct. This impression is reinforced by Congress' reiteration that under common law principles of equitable subordination,
courts would rarely subordinate tax claims.1 06
Unfortunately, the drafters left an element of ambiguity in the
statute by stating that along with claims tainted by inequitable
conduct, penalty claims could be subordinated. 107 For courts interpreting the statute in light of Congress' apparent willingness to allow development by the courts,1 08 the ambiguity became an invitation to expand the definition of equitable subordination.
EXPANSION OF EQUITABLE SUBORDINATION

Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, the government could not
collect penalty claims 0 9 from bankrupt parties. 1 0 The Bankruptcy
Code, however, rejected the view that penalties should not play a
part in the bankruptcy proceeding. 1 Therefore, it was unsurpris106. 124 CONG. REc. 32,412 (statement of Rep. Edwards) ("under
principles of existing case law, a tax claim would rarely be subordinated"), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 6499.
107. Id. at 32,398 (statement of Rep. Edwards) ("a claim is generally subordinated
if
the claim itself is of a status susceptible to subordination, such as a penalty"), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6452.
108. See id. (statement of Rep. Edwards) ("It is intended that the term 'principles of
equitable subordination' follow existing case law and leave to the courts development of this
principle.").
109. Penalty claims are claims by the IRS to collect additions to taxes from the debtor for
failure to make a reasonable attempt to pay taxes or for delinquent payment of taxes. In re
Burden, 917 F.2d 115, 116 (3d Cir. 1990).
110. Section 57(]) of the 1898 Act prohibited the Government from collecting nonpecumary loss penalties. 11 U.S.C. § 93(j) (1976) (repealed 1978); see Simonson v. Grainquist, 369
U.S. 38, 40-41 (1962) (explaining that Congress enacted section 57(j) to protect unsecured
creditors from the debtor's wrongful conduct, on the theory that innocent parties should not
have to bear the burden of penalties that were intended to punish the bankrupt). Section
507(a)(7)(g) of 11 U.S.C. specifically includes penalties that are "in compensation for actual
pecuniary loss." 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(7)(g) (1988); see also In re Kline, 403 F Supp. 974 (D.
Md. 1975), aff'd, 547 F.2d 823 (4th Cir. 1977) (holding that § 57(0) accomplished the congressional policy of protecting innocent creditors). In Simonson, the Supreme Court interpreted this provision as applicable to secured or unsecured debt. Simonson, 369 U.S. at 82.
111. Section 726(a)(4) of 11 U.S.C. provides:
Except as provided in section 510 of this title, property of the estate shall be
distributed-
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ing that the courts sought to ensure that they could subordinate
these penalty claims. 112 If the courts did not subordinate or disallow penalty claims, creditors would be penalized for debtors'
misconduct.
To avoid penalizing innocent creditors for debtor misconduct,
courts began to subordinate penalty claims on equitable
grounds. 1 3 These courts crafted arguments utilizing their equitable powers to reach conclusions that proclaimed just results.'1 4 The
Seventh Circuit exceeded the existing common law, 11 5 however, by
announcing that inequitable conduct was notl6 a prerequisite to subordination in IRS-asserted penalty claims.
In re Virtual Network Services Corp.
In In re Virtual Network Services Corp.," 7 Virtual Network
Services (VNS) filed a petition for relief under Chapter 11, to
which the IRS responded by filing a claim for employment and
withholding taxes pursuant to section 507(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy
Code.""' Approximately ten percent of the amount claimed by the
IRS represented tax penalties that the IRS had assessed against
VNS prior to its petitioning the bankruptcy court for relief. 19 The
IRS characterized the penalty portion of its claim as a general un-

Fourth, in payment of any allowed claim, whether secured or unsecured,
for any fine, penalty or forfeiture, or for multiple, exemplary, or punitive damto the extent that such fine, penalty, forfeiture, or damages are not
ages
compensation for actual pecuniary loss suffered by the holder of such claim[.]
11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(4) (1988).
112. See infra note 212 and accompanying text. Other courts recognized offsetting concerns. See Fabricators, Inc. v. Technical Fabricators, Inc. (In re Fabricators, Inc.), 926 F.2d
1458, 1459 (5th Cir. 1991) (recognizing the need to use the equitable subordination remedy
sparingly); Unsecured Creditors Comm. of Pacific Express, Inc. v. Pioneer Commercial
Funding Corp. (In re Pacific Express, Inc.), 69 B.R. 112, 116 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1986) (noting
the importance of a creditor's position); Trone v. Smith (In re Westgate-California Corp.),
642 F.2d 1174, 1177 (9th Cir. 1981) (recognizing the need to use the equitable subordination
remedy sparingly).
113. See supra notes 40-70 and accompanying text.
114. See supra notes 40-70 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 40-78 and accompanying text.
116. In re Virtual Network Servs. Corp., 902 F.2d. 1246, 1247 (7th Cir. 1990).
117. 98 B.R. 343 (Bankr. N.D. IlM.1989), aff'd, 902 F.2d 1246 (7th Cir. 1990).
118. Id. at 344.
119. Id. at 343.
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secured claim.120 VNS objected to the government's request that
the court place the IRS claims in parity with those of the other
general unsecured creditors, arguing that the court should
subordinate penalty claims on equitable principles for two reasons:
first, a delay would result from the IRS's collecting the penalties,
and second, the effect of parity would be to shift the penalty from
the debtor to the innocent creditors.' 2 ' The bankruptcy court ruled
for the IRS, but the district court reversed.' 22 The Seventh Circuit
affirmed the district court's decision to subordinate the IRS's pen2
alty claim.

The main thrust of VNS's argument in the bankruptcy court was
that 11 U.S.C. § 726(a), which provides for the automatic subordination of penalty claims in Chapter 7 liquidations,2 4 was applicable to Chapter 11 liquidations as well. 25 The bankruptcy court
quickly dispensed with this argument by pointing out that the
Code states specifically that section 726(a) applies only to cases
under Chapter 7 126 VNS made one final effort to prove that subordination was proper by adding that subordination was also possible
under section 510(c)(1). 12 7 To make this contention, VNS was
forced to argue that the court could solve the ambiguity in section
510(c) by referring to the legislative history, which arguably
demonstrated no prerequisite of inequitable conduct. 128
In addressing the legislative history argument, the district court
was reluctant to look at legislative interpretation, 129 but ultimately
it recognized the necessity of turning to "the ashcans of the legislative process 1 3 to resolve the ambiguity in the phrase "under prin120. Id.
121. Id. at 344.
122. Id. at 353.
123. In re Virtual Network Servs. Corp., 902 F.2d 1246, 1250 (7th Cir. 1990), aff'g 98 B.R.
343 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989).
124. 11 U.S.C. § 726(a) (1988).
125. Virtual Network, 98 B.R. at 344.
126. Id. "Subchapters I and II of chapter 7 of this title apply only in a case under such
chapter." 11 U.S.C. § 103(b).
127. Virtual Network, 98 B.R. at 345. The district court noted that the argument did not
appear initially in VNS's brief; it appeared instead in the surreply to the government's supplemental response as well as in one footnote in the reply brief. Id. at 345.
128. Id. at 345-47.
129. Id. at 345-46.
130. Id. at 345 (quoting CHARLES P CURTIS, IT'S YOUR LAW 52 (1954)).
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ciples of equitable subordination."1 31 Foreshadowing the limited
force of its holding, the district court cited ten sources that argued
against the use of legislative history, 13 2 leading the court to recognize "a growing restiveness with the judiciary's readiness to consult
extrinsic materials."' 3 3 In the court's opinion, the inherent
problems of consulting legislative history-the danger that views of
staff members or lobbyists, having been smuggled into the history,
would override statutory text-made
the use of such materials a
34
dubious exercise to be avoided.1
The court nonetheless ended a lengthy recital of its concerns by
acknowledging that the use of legislative history by the Supreme
Court had increased and that in some cases, the use of legislative
history had proved helpful in interpreting statutes.'3 5 The district
court's reasoning was erroneous, though, given that the current Supreme Court has been reluctant to use legislative history as a
source of statutory interpretation. 36
The Legislative History
The district court considered the following arguments regarding
the legislative history of section 510(c): first, in the initial version
of the bill, the House judiciary committee had recognized that
Congress intended section 510 to codify Pepper and Taylor but it
had nonetheless included the statement, "[t]he court's power is
broader than the general doctrine of equitable subordination, and

131. Id.
132. Id. (citing Trustees v. Allied Prods. Corp., 872 F.2d 208 (7th Cir. 1989); In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340 (7th Cir. 1989); Covolt v. Carey Canada Inc., 860 F.2d 1434 (7th Cir.
1988); In re Kelly, 841 F.2d 908 (9th Cir. 1988); IBEW v. NLRB, 814 F.2d 697, 715-20 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) (Buckley, J., concurring); FEC v. Rose, 806 F.2d 1081, 1089-90 (D.C. Cir. 1986);
Wallace v. Christensen, 802 F.2d 1539, 1559-60 (9th Cir. 1986) (Kozinski, J., concurring);
Hirschey v. FERC, 777 F.2d 1, 7-8 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia, J., concurring)); see also Frank
H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARv. J. L. &
PUB. POL'y 59 (1987); Kenneth W. Starr, Observations About the Use of Legislative History,
1987 DuKE L. J. 371, 375-79.
133. Virtual Network, 98 B.R. at 345.
134. Id. at 345-46.
135. Id. at 346 (citing Jorge L. Carro & Andrew R. Brann, The U.S. Supreme Court and
the Use of Legislative Histories: A StatisticalAnalysis, 22 JUMRMIcs J. 294 (1982)).
136. See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, Textualism, Constitutionalism,and the Interpretation
of Federal Statutes, 32 Whi. & MARY L. REV. 827, 833-34 (1991).
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encompasses subordination on any equitable grounds"; 137 second,
the committee had stated that courts "rarely" would subordinate
tax claims, although in the initial version of the bill, the committee
had provided that a court may not subordinate a tax claim on equitable grounds;18 and finally, the statements of the sponsors
indicated that creditor misconduct was not a prerequisite for subordination.'3 9
The court rejected the argument that the House committee's
change from "on equitable grounds" to "under principles of equitable subordination"'140 indicated congressional intent to permit
subordination even without a showing of inequity Although VNS
was the party that brought this language to the court's attention,
the language appeared to indicate that the committee rejected a
broad understanding of a bankruptcy court's power. 14 This interpretation would favor the government's position that Congress did
not intend subordination to include tax claims. 42 The court, however, did not allow the argument to assist either side, stating that
successive drafts provide little information about the final form of
43
the legislation because drafts are not necessarily sequential.
The government then raised the argument that the initial version of the bill stated that a tax claim could never be subordinated,
but the court pointed out that this ultimately changed to a tax
claim would "rarely be subordinated.' 14 4 Unlike the argument advanced by VNS to assist its case, this change did not refute the
government's position; it only created the possibility that a case
might exist because the committee substituted the term "rarely"
for "never." The government contended that the word "rarely" was
a recognition by the drafters that, because of the requirement of
creditor misconduct, the government usually would not be subject

137. Virtual Network, 98 B.R. at 346 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
359 (1987) (emphasis omitted), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5963, 6315)).
138. Id. at 347 (quoting S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 74 (1978), reprintedin 1978

U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5860).
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id. at 348.
Id. at 348-49.
Id. at 350.
See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
Virtual Network, 98 B.R. at 346.
Id. at 347 (emphasis added).
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509

to subordination. 14 5 To support its position, the government of-

fered the committee report regarding section 724(a), 46 which
stated:
Subsection (a) of section 724 permits the trustee to avoid a lien
that secures a fine, penalty
to the extent that the claim is
not compensation for actual pecuniary loss. The subsection follows the policy found in section 57j of the Bankruptcy Act of
protecting unsecured creditors from the debtor's wrongdoing,
but expands the protections afforded. The lien is made voidable
rather than void in chapter 7, in order to permit the lien to be
revived if the case is converted to chapter 11, under which penalty liens are not voidable. To make the lien void would be to
permit the filing of a chapter 7, the voiding of the lien, and the
conversion to a chapter 11, simply to avoid a penalty lien,
which should be valid in a reorganizationcase.147

The government argued that this language clearly indicated that
the committee understood that under Chapter 11, a penalty claim
14 8
would not be subordinated.

The court refused to adopt the government's position, holding
that the word "rarely" did not refer to the requirement of misconduct because only "normally" is creditor misconduct required. 1 49

As support, the court inferred that the Senate committee was
aware of In re Stirling Homex Corp.,150 a case that the court believed "illustrate[d] that creditor misconduct was not a necessary
condition of equitable subordination.' 5' The court explained the
use of the word "rarely" by hypothesizing:

145. Id.
146. 11 U.S.C. § 724(a) (1988).
147. Virtual Network, 98 B.R. at 347-48 (quoting S. RFP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 96
(1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.CAN. 5787, 5882; H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
382 (1977) (emphasis added), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.CAN. 5963, 6338).
148. Id. at 348.
149. Id. at 347.
150. Jezarian v. Raichle (In re Stirling Homex Corp.), 579 F.2d 206 (2d Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1074 (1979).
151. Virtual Network, 98 B.R. at 347. Although the court stated that the shareholders
were not engaged in inequitable conduct, id., arguably this is not true. The court in Homex
could have viewed the shareholders' conduct as inequitable or could have applied priority
principles to keep the shareholders from recharacterizing their claims by alleging fraud. See
supra notes 80-102 and accompanying text (discussing Homex).
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"rare" might also refer to the committee's belief that Chapter 11
liquidations would be scarce. It might also reflect the belief that
claims for non-compensatory tax penalties in Chapter 11 liquidations would be uncommon. Or, more likely yet, the staff (and
of subordination
Members) simply did not foresee the problem
152
in the context of Chapter 11 liquidations.
The court dismissed the government's supporting argument by distinguishing between Chapter 11 "reorganizations"-the language
used in the committee report regarding section 724(a)-and Chapter 11 liquidations. 153 The court argued that without specific language concerning Congress' knowledge of the differences between
to this passage
reorganizations and liquidations, giving any weight
54
erroneous.
be
would
report
committee
the
from
The district court's analysis was flawed; it stated that the Senate
committee must have been aware of the Homex opinion, a case involving a reorganization that turned into a liquidation, 5 yet at the
same time, the court asserted that the committee could not distinguish a reorganization from a liquidation. If, as the district court
stated, the committee did not understand the principles involved
in Homex, then it was illogical to infer that Congress, on the basis
of that opinion, intended to expand the theory of equitable subordination. Distilled to its essence, the district court's argument was
that Congress did not understand the case that supplies the only
explicit evidence that Congress may have intended to allow courts
to subordinate equitably without a finding of misconduct; despite
this incongruity, the court found that subordination without a
showing of misconduct was proper.
As a result of this analysis, the court concluded that the committee reports could not add anything to the ambiguity in section 510
and turned to a second source of extrinsic evidence to assist in understanding the Code, the identical statements of the bill's sponsors, Representative Donald Edwards and Senator Dennis DeConcini. 56 The district court believed that the statement, "[iut is

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Virtual Network, 98 B.R. at 347.
Id. at 348.
Id.
See supra notes 79-101 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
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intended that the term 'principles of equitable subordination' follow existing case law and leave to the courts the development 1of
58
this principle,'

157

established that Congress favored expansion.

Moreover, the statement, "[t]o date, under existing law, a claim is
generally subordinated only if [the] holder of such claim is guilty
of inequitable conduct, or the claim itself is of a status susceptible
to subordination such as a penalty,"159 established that Congress
intended to include "no fault" subordination of penalty cases.1 60
Although the district court indicated that the inquiry did not
end simply because the legislative history demonstrated that Congress did not intend to limit subordination to cases involving inequitable conduct,1 6 1 for all practical purposes the question was resolved. The government could argue only that having VNS's
unsecured creditors pay for VNS's wrongs was not unfair, but the
court quickly dispensed with the notion that punishing individuals
who were not guilty could be equitable. 16 2 Once saddled with the

burden of proving the claims nonpenal or demonstrating that the
IRS stood on a par with other general unsecured
creditors, the gov63
obstacle.1
insurmountable
an
faced
ernment
157. Virtual Network, 98 B.R. at 348 (quoting 124 CONG. REc. 32,398 (1978) (remarks of
Rep. Edwards), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C-AN. 5787, 6452; id. at 33,998 (remarks of Sen.
DeConcini), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C--N. at 6452, 6521).
158. Id. at 349.
159. Id. at 348.
160. Id. at 349. The court addressed the unreliability of the statements of individual legislators and the dismissal of the usual preference for the official committee reports by arguing that because the committee reports had been held ambiguous, the reliance on the individual statements was necessary. Id. The court indicated a willingness to rely on these
particular floor statements because they were the statements of the sponsors of the legislation and because the legislators possibly had relied on these statements in determining how
to vote. Id. at 349-50.
161. Id. at 350-51.
162. Id. at 352.
163. The district court did not find that the claims made by the IRS were the type
considered to be a "tax claim." As the district court noted, however, the penalty provisions m the tax code are expressly meant to deter and punish: two
goals in contravention of any equity or equitable considerations. The IRS's attempt to recharacterize the tax penalty as a tax claim in order to avoid subordination is not new, but it has never succeeded nor do we conclude it should be
successful here.
In re Virtual Network Servs. Corp., 902 F.2d 1246, 1249 (7th Cir. 1990).
The IRS also attacked the district court's findings that the tax penalty claims were punitive in nature by recharacterizmg the nature of its clanns as "unlike other nonpecumary loss
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The importance of the outcome of the legislative history argument is apparent from the fact that the court dedicated seven
pages of its opinion to untangling this thorny mess. Once the court
decided the argument in VNS's favor, though, it needed only two
pages to conclude that a court may subordinate penalty claims
consistent with the purpose of equitable subordination.1 6 4 The true
controversy in these cases, therefore, is whether courts hold the
power to subordinate claims in all instances, because if they do,
they rarely will hesitate to exercise it to subordinate the government's penalty claims.
The Trend
The Seventh Circuit validated the district court's arguments, reiterating them and adding very little. To answer the government's
argument that language in the committee report indicated that a
court rarely would subordinate a tax claim, the court of appeals
stated that IRS penalty claims are not "tax claims" but "tax penalties."'1 5 By inferring that the committee was not referring to "tax
penalties," the court held that this section of the committee report
66
was inapplicable.1
Once the Seventh Circuit crafted its no fault subordination position, the government began to lose the battle to achieve parity
with general creditors for its nonpecuniary penalty claims in cases
involving circumstances similar to those in Virtual Network. The
first circuit to adopt the Virtual Network opinion was the Eighth
Circuit in Schultz Broadway Inn v. United States.6 7 The Eighth
Circuit reached the same conclusion as the Seventh Circuit, but for
slightly different reasons. It emphasized Congress' rejection of the
Senate version of section 510 that would have exempted government tax claims.6 8 The court believed that this rejection demonstrated the intent of the legislature to allow subordination in some

penalties, [in that they] are designed not just to punish the debtor, but also serve to protect
the integrity of the tax systems and to reimburse the Government for
costs incurred as
a result of certain taxpayer misconduct." Id. at 1250 (quoting Appellant's Brief at 9).
164. Virtual Network, 98 B.R. at 351-52.
165. Virtual Network, 902 F.2d at 1249.
166. Id. at 1248.
167. 912 F.2d 230, 231 (8th Cir. 1990).
168. Id. at 232.
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cases."6 9 Otherwise, the opinion was remarkably similar to Virtual
Network, resting on the statements of the sponsors and the infer170
ence that Congress was aware of the Homex opinion.
The Third Circuit also adopted Virtual Network and extended
it to a case involving a Chapter 13 liquidation in In re Burden.1 7 1
The court held that, unlike Chapter 7,172 Chapters 11 and 13
shared the common characteristic that Congress had not explicitly
provided for subordination of penalty claims.17 Thus, the court
found no reason to believe that Congress intended to apply section
510 to Chapter 11 cases and Chapter 13 cases differently 174 Without a reason to treat the two differently, the court viewed Virtual
Network as a logical precedent and expanded its reasoning to cover
Chapter 13 reorganizations. 1 75 The court remanded the case because the district court had subordinated the claims as a matter of
law.1 76 The appellate court found no indication that Congress intended automatic subordination; because the district court was exercising its equitable jurisdiction, it had to weigh the equities on a
177
case-by-case basis.
Burden is enlightening not for its rank-and-file majority opinion,
but for its dissenting opinion, which probes the reasoning of the
court in Virtual Network. Judge Alito began his dissent by recognizing that " '[t]he normal rule of statutory construction is that if
Congress intends for legislation to change the interpretation of a
judicially created concept, it makes that intent specific.' '17' He
stated that "[t]his rule should be followed 'with particular care in
bankruptcy codifications,' ,,179 and that section 510 is an instance
in which courts particularly should follow this principle because

169. Id.
170. Id. at 232-33; see supra notes 149-60 and accompanying text.
171. 917 F.2d 115 (3d Cir. 1990).
172. 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(4) explicitly subordinates tax penalties to the fourth position. See
supra note 111.
173. Burden, 917 F.2d at 118.
174. Id. at 118-19.
175. Id. at 117-18.
176. Id. at 119.
177. Id. at 120.
178. Id. at 121 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Midlantic
Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 501 (1986)).
179. Id. (quoting Midlantic Nat'l Bank, 474 U.S. at 501).
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the sponsors intended for the codification of existing case law, including the requirement of inequitable conduct.'
As for the ambiguity in the phrase "principles of equitable subordination," the dissent contended that the Fifth Circuit had summarized the case law as it existed in 1979, when the Bankruptcy
Code codified the principles of equitable subordination as expressed in In re Mobile Steel.' l To the dissent, the "paucity of
contrary authority in the decisions addressing the subordination of
nonpecuniary loss tax penalties [was] telling."'182 Judge Alito's view
of the one case that had not explicitly utilized the Mobile Steel
framework-In re Stirling Homex Corp.183-differed from the
majority's:
Although the Second Circuit did not explicitly label [the shareholder's] conduct inequitable, its decision was clearly based on
the view that their conduct was designed to achieve an inequitable result that should not be permitted. Thus, even if In re Stirling Homex Corp. was a departure from prior precedent, it did
not abandon the concept that equitable subordination must be
based on the conduct of the individual claimant. At most, In re
Stirling Homex Co. 8represented
an incremental change in the
4
established doctrine.
The dissent went on to argue that the majority's holding in Burden "represent[ed] a sharp break from established doctrine codified in Section 510(c)(1).'

i 5

The dissent rejected the contention

that the sequence of events that led to section 510's enactment was
irrelevant. 8 6 The congressional rejection of the initial proposal of
the Bankruptcy Commission-that the Code subordinate all penalty claims-and the adoption instead of automatic subordination
in Chapter 7 cases led Judge Alito to conclude that Congress did
180. Id. at 121-22.
181. Id. at 122 (referring to Benjamin v. Diamond (In re Mobile Steel Co.), 563 F.2d 692,
700 (5th Cir. 1977)).
182. Id.
183. Jezarian v. Raichle (In re Stirling Homex Corp.), 579 F.2d 206 (2d Cir. 1978), cert.
dented, 439 U.S. 1074 (1979).
184. Burden, 917 F.2d at 122 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
185. Id.
186. Id.
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not want penalties subordinated in proceedings under other
chapters.187
He also rejected the majority's emphasis on the statements made
on the House and Senate floor. Judge Alito posited that the development of the principle of equitable subordination mentioned in
these statements was included to allow the incremental change
represented by Homex, not to allow courts radically to alter existing precedent.8 8 As for the reference to "a penalty," the dissent
believed the meaning was ambiguous and
"under existing law," as previously noted, penalties were not
"susceptible to subordination." Since it is impossible to determine what Representative Edwards and Senator DeConcini
meant when they referred to "a- penalty," that reference should
not control the interpretation of the statute. Moreover, whatever
Representative Edwards and Senator DeConcini had in mind, a
single, ambiguous reference to "a penalty" in their floor statements could not have alerted the other members of Congress
that the new code would fundamentally change the "principles
of equitable subordination" recognized by the courts. A fleeting
reference in floor statements-even authoritative floor statements by sponsors of the proposed legislation-should not be
given controlling weight. 189
The dissent's arguments exemplify the difficulties of relying on legislative interpretation to justify a change in the law. The concerns
of the district court in Virtual Network regarding the complexities
of interpreting legislative history 90-ambiguity and multiple interpretations-become all too clear. Courts, therefore, should not rely
on this history as a justification for a major change in the law.
The Ramifications of Expansin
That courts choose to subordinate nonpecuniary claims is not remarkable. It is based on sound logic-if penalties are not subordinated, the innocent creditor will be punished for the debtor's mis187. Id. at 122-23.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 123 (quoting 124 CONG. REC. 32,416 (1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 6499).
190. See supra notes 156-64 and accompanying text.
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conduct. The danger in expanding the scope of equitable
subordination, however, beyond the immediate effect upon the
government's ability to obtain payment for the penalties it has assessed, lies in the broad language that the appellate court used in
Virtual Network:
We further conclude, as did the district court, that the principles of equitable subordination are broader than the doctrine
which developed prior to § 510(c)(1)'s enactment. It is clear that
in principle, equitable subordination no longer requires, in all
circumstances, some inequitable conduct on the part of the
creditor
The district court concluded that equitable subordination under § 510(c)(1) could be applied in this case, inter
alia, because 1) the goal of equitable subordination focuses not
on the conduct of the creditor but on the fairness to creditors in
a particular case, 2) punishing or deterring VNS's innocent creditors because of VNS's wrongful conduct serves no purpose, and
3) the IRS's claims in this case are punitive in nature. 191
The district court in Virtual Network recognized the implications
of its actions. By deviating from Mobile Steel's empirical test 92
and Comstock's restraints 9 3 and venturing into the ambiguous
area of "injustice" that had plagued courts attempting to apply
Pepper v. Litton's analysis,19 4 courts may be returning the doctrine
of equitable subordination to the problems that took the courts decades to remedy The district court in Virtual Network seized control and reluctantly attempted to accomplish the goal of reaching a
just result in a unique case:
Framing the court's power in these terms, however, seems to
embrace the expansive notion of equitable power we disclaimed
above: for it appears to invest the courts with the authority to
arrange the claims of unsecured creditors in whatever manner
they deem "fair." We concede there is some danger in attempting to steer a straight course with only "fairness" as the rudder.
191. In re Virtual Network Servs. Corp., 902 F.2d 1246, 1250 (7th Cir. 1990) (emphasis
added).
192. Benjamin v. Diamond (In re Mobile Steel Co.), 563 F.2d 692 (5th Cir. 1977); see
supra text accompanying note 73.
193. Comstock v. Group of Institutional Investors, 335 U.S. 211 (1948); see supra notes
50-70 and accompanying text.
194. 308 U.S. 295 (1939); see supra notes 40-49 and accompanying text.
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We are not convinced, however, that this danger is sufficient to
justify applying the doctrine of equitable subordination by reference to one of its grounds rather than its goal
While it is
true that "fairness" is an open-ended concept, and therefore
may someday become a talismanic phrase which courts use as an
excuse rather than as a justification for subordinating a claim,
slippery
"fear of the future, of what's at the bottom of a1 9 long,
5
slope, is not a good reason for today's decision."'

In In re Vitreous Steel Products Co.,19 6 the Seventh Circuit provided dramatic evidence of the possible impact of its decision in
Virtual Network. Vitreous Steel involved an institutional investor's attempt to find a new owner for a company that was in financial difficulty 197 The company alleged that the conduct between
the bank and the prospective owner was collusive.' 9 8 The bankruptcy court did nQt reach the issue of whether the bank's conduct
required subordinating its claims against the troubled company
because it granted summary judgment to the bank on other
grounds. 199 On appeal, the circuit court reversed the grant of summary judgment and specifically instructed the bankruptcy court
that on remand
the bankruptcy court is obligated to make findings of fact as to
whether the bank's actions call for subordination of its debt
under the balancing test of Matter of Mobile Steel Co. The
court should consider [Mobile Steel's three factors]
We
recently held in Matter of Virtual Network Services Corp. that
it is not necessarily required that the creditor be found to have
engaged in misconduct. We stated that the inquiry is to be made
on a case-by-case basis focussing [sic] on fairness to the other
creditors.

00

The Seventh Circuit's extension of Virtual Network to a case
involving a pecuniary claim by an institutional investor demon-

195. In re Virtual Network Servs. Corp., 98 B.R. 343, 351 (N.D. Il1. 1989) (quoting Marozsan v. United States, 852 F.2d 1469, 1499 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting)), afl'd, 902 F.2d 1246 (9th Cir. 1990).
196. 911 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir. 1990).
197. Id. at 1227.
198. Id. at 1232.
199. Id. at 1234.
200. Id. at 1237 (citations omitted).
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strates the dangerous ramifications of that opinion's broad language. Noticeably absent from Vitreous Steel are the two factors
discussed in Virtual Network-punishing the creditor for the
debtor's misconduct, and a punitive claim. 201 The court in Vitreous
Steel transformed the holding in Virtual Network into a simple
evisceration of the misconduct requirement, unconstrained by the
finding of a nonpecuniary claim and a penal claim.
The willingness of courts to return the law to a position in which
"fairness" is the only guideline for application of the devastating
principle of equitable subordination could undermine the Bankruptcy Code. The courts that have chosen to expand their equitable powers deserve no commendation for their cavalier willingness
to throw the doctrine of equitable subordination back to the unformulated principles of fairness; rather, they should be criticized
for endangering the security of creditors.
THE RETREAT FROM VIRTUAL NETWORK

The Seventh Circuit
Two months after the Seventh Circuit decided Virtual Network,
a different panel decided Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First
Bank of Whzting.2 °2 Kham & Nate's Shoes (KNS) applied for, and
received, the right to reorganize under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.203 Pursuant to a judicial order, all postpetition loans
were to receive "super-priority "2o4 One of KNS's existing credi-

tors, a bank, loaned KNS money after the bankruptcy court issued
a reorganization order granting new creditors additional protection.2" 5 At one point during the reorganization process, the bank
terminated the line of credit that induced KNS's suppliers to draw
on letters of credit. 0 6 This action created debt that the bank could
claim deserved super-priority under the judicial order.2 07 By giving

201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

See supra text accompanying note 142.
908 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1990).
Id. at 1353.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1354.
Id.
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KNS a line of credit, the bank, while still a creditor of some unsecured debt, became a creditor of first-priority debt as well.20°
KNS successfully argued to the bankruptcy and district courts
that the bank's action, designed to change its position in the reorganization, warranted subordination of its claim under section
510(c).20 9 Judge Easterbrook's majority opinion refused to expand
the doctrine of equitable subordination, noting that section 510(c)
does not provide criteria for the exercise of the court's equitable
power.210 Instead of analyzing legislative history, he deferred to the
common law 211 Judge Easterbrook did not ignore the Virtual Network decision; he simply narrowly construed that case to mean
that subordination is possible when a penalty is created by operation of law and the creditor has delayed in collecting the penalty to
the detriment of other creditors.1 2 Because the bank in Kham &
Nate's Shoes was not attempting to collect a penalty, Easterbrook
held that the Virtual Network line of cases was inapplicable. 213 Af-

ter dispensing with the argument that the court should apply no
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 1356.
211. Id.
212. Id. The district and circuit court opinions mentioned the IRS's delay as a basis for
their reasoning. The fact that Judge Easterbrook seized on this single fact indicated his
desire to root § 510 in some type of injurious behavior or, more likely, to limit the Virtual
Network holding as much as possible.
Even this decision may not be much of a victory for the government because courts have
shown a willingness to construe the term "penalty" very broadly. See In re Schultz Broadway Inn, Ltd., 89 B.R. 43 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1988) (subordinating a negligence penalty assessed by the IRS), af'd, 912 F.2d 230, 231 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Mansfield Tire
& Rubber Co. (In re Mansfield Tire & Rubber Co.), 80 B.R. 395 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987)
(finding excise taxes to be penalties requiring subordination m Chapter 11 cases). But see
Compton Corp. v. United States Dep't of Energy (In re Compton Corp.), 40 B.R. 875
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1984) (holding that a restitution claim did not constitute a penalty); In re
Graf Bros., Inc., 38 B.R. 237 (Bankr. D. Me. 1984) (ruling that a highway use tax was not a
penalty but a means of allocating construction costs).
Punitive damage claims, because of their penal nature, also have been found to be subject
to subordination under § 510(c)(1). See In re Colin, 44 B.R. 806 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984)
(stating that punitive damage claims are penalty claims imposed not to afford redress, but
to deter wrongful conduct). On the other hand, courts also have disallowed punitive damage
claims under Chapter 11. See In re A.H. Robins Co., 89 B.R. 555, 563 (E.D. Va. 1988) (refusing to subordinate a punitive damage claim because such action would merely postpone
inequitable treatment of creditors).
213. Kham & Nate's Shoes, 908 F.2d at 1356.
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fault subordination, Judge Easterbrook utilized the framework established in Mobile Steel 214 and defined inequitable conduct as a
high hurdle that the bank had failed to clear.215
Kham & Nate's Shoes represents a breath of fresh air in an environment polluted by legislative interpretation. The Seventh Circuit avoided returning to the questionable endeavor of interpreting
legislative history and in the process limited Virtual Network to
the narrowest construction possible.
Other Circuits
The Fifth and Sixth Circuits have also rejected invitations to
erode the doctrine of equitable subordination, limiting Virtual
Network to its precise facts. In In re Fabricators,Inc.,216 the Fifth
Circuit had the option of rejecting the inequitable conduct requirement in a case involving a lender who had assumed control of a
corporation.2117 The court held that it would continue to apply the

Mobile Steel framework, including the requirement that the creditor act inequitably, before subordinating the creditor's claim.21s
In In re Mansfield Tire & Rubber Co., 219 the Sixth Circuit de-

cided a case with facts similar to Virtual Network but required
only a small extension to the existing no fault subordination precedent. 220 In Mansfield Tire, a bankruptcy trustee attempted equita214. See supra notes 71-77 and accompanying text.
215. Kham & Nate's Shoes, 908 F.2d at 1357. Judge Easterbrook defined inequitable con-

duct in the commercial context as "breach plus some advantage-taking." Id. at 1357. The
majority found that although KNS was in a difficult position, the bank did not create the
difficulty and only acted in conformity with its contract. Id. The fact that the contract had
the possibility of creating hardship did not make the conduct of the bank inequitable. Id. at
1358; cf. Comstock v. Group of Institutional Investors, 335 U.S. 211 (1947) (holding that
inequitable conduct did not occur due to a finding of good faith).
At least one commentator has criticized Judge Easterbrook's approach. See Dennis M.
Patterson, A Fable from the Seventh Circuit:Frank Easterbrookon Good Faith,76 IOWA L.
REV. 503, 504 (1991) (stating that the "Kham opinion does not represent a judicious rendering of substantive commercial law, but instead is a fable bearing only faint relation to the
legal issues that should have been addressed in that case").
216. Fabricators Inc. v. Technical Fabricators, Inc. (In re Fabricators, Inc.), 926 F.2d 1458
(5th Cir. 1991).
217. Id. at 1467.
218. Id. at 1465.
219. United States v. Mansfield Tire & Rubber Co. (In re Mansfield Tire & Rubber Co.),
942 F.2d 1055 (6th Cir. 1991).
220. Id. at 1061.
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bly to subordinate what the court determined was a nonpenalty
IRS tax claim. 2 ' The trustee relied on the holding in Virtual Network and did not allege any inequitable conduct on the part of the
IRS. 222 The Sixth Circuit refused to expand the reach of Virtual
Network, preferring to confine it at best t6 tax penalty cases. 223
"We continue to recognize that equitable subordination in bankruptcy may be appropriate if the claimholder is guilty of inequitable conduct
We decline [the trustee's] invitation to extend
equitable subordination
of federal tax claims in the absence of

some inequitable conduct

")224

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

A Framework
Courts following Judge Easterbrook have rejected invitations to
extend the doctrine of no fault subordination. Courts should limit
the holding in Virtual Network to cases with similar facts, applying it only when a penalty is created by operation of law and when
the delay in collecting the penalty has injured other creditors. Subordination is justified in cases in which these factors are present
because some misconduct exists-the delay-and the penalty will
not shift to innocent creditors. Absent these factors, courts should
continue to apply the Mobile Steel framework; 225 otherwise they
risk damaging the security of creditors and undermining the Bankruptcy Code.226
Allowing subordination only when these factors exist recognizes
the type of "subtle" inequitable conduct that the court in In re
Stirling Homex 227 determined justified subordination and repre-

221. Id. at 1056.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 1061.
224. Id. at 1062.
225. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
226. See First Nat'l Bank v. Rafoth (In re Baker & Getty Fin. Servs., Inc.), 974 F.2d 712
(6th Cir. 1992) (refusing to extend the Virtual Network reasoning to cases not involving
punitive damages).
227. Jezaran v. Raichle (In re Stirling Homex Corp.), 579 F.2d 206 (1978); see supra
notes 82-99 and accompanying text.
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sents only "an incremental change to established doctrine.

'228

If

the legislative history permits any expansion, it is this small incremental change, not a fundamental break with the existing precedent embodied in the Mobile Steel framework. To dismiss the requirement of inequitable conduct is to reject the entire body of law
that Congress intended to codify; Pepper v. Litton,229 Taylor v.
Standard Gas & Electric Co., 230 and Comstock v. Group of Institu-

tional Investors2 1 all involved creditor misconduct.
Identifying Underlying Motwations

The courts in Virtual Network and its progeny could have
grounded their opinions in the more logical and equitable argument that penalty claims unjustly transfer punishment from the
debtor to the innocent creditor.1 2 Instead, these courts used analysis that was rooted in ambiguous legislative interpretation. 3 3 Understanding why these courts went to such lengths only to reach
the same results that they would have achieved under the existing
framework is important.
One underlying reason for the courts' tactics was the desire for
increased lender liability The increase in lender liability is a trend
that was recognized long before Virtual Network.234 To the financial community, Virtual Network represents yet another attempt
228. In re Burden, 917 F.2d 115, 122 (3d Cir. 1990) (Alito, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
229. 308 U.S. 295 (1939).
230. 306 U.S. 307 (1939).
231. 335 U.S. 211 (1948).
232. See supra note 212 and accompanying text (explaining courts' willingness to
subordinate penalty and punitive claims and describing how Judge Easterbrook interpreted
Virtual Network to stand for the proposition that creditors should not be penalized for
debtors' misconduct).
233. See supra notes 118-64 and accompanying text.
234. See William H. Lawrence, Lender Control Liability: An Analytical Model Illustrated with Applications to the Relational Theory of Secured Financing,62 S. CAL. L. REV.
1387, 1387-88 (1989). Professor Lawrence states:
Recent claims of lender liability have captured the attention of the practicing
bar and potentially affected clients as few other topics ever have. Either as a
response to difficult economic times or as a reaction to the immense success
enjoyed by several plaintiffs, lender liability has attracted extensive national
attention. Over the years, an impressive array of nearly a dozen legal theories
have developed
Although application of these theories to lenders is not
new, plaintiffs' lawyers have begun pressing these claims with renewed enthusi-
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to expand the exposure of lenders in bankruptcy proceedings. The
danger of judicial action against lenders comes in many forms, including equitable subordination. Helen Chaitman, in her work The
Ten Commandments for Avozding Lender Liability,3 5 provides
some excellent examples of the types of "improper" lender
behav23 6
lender.
a
punish
to
want
judge
a
make
could
ior that
Some of these pitfalls are classic reasons for equitable subordination and would meet the requirements for subordination as outlined in Mobile Steel. Some of the requirements, however, such as
"making a sudden move," or "arrogance," would not meet the test
of inequitable conduct. If a court wants to penalize for this type of
misbehavior, or any type that does not fall within the present
scope of inequitable conduct, then the court must find an alternative theory of liability The answer for some courts came in the
form of no fault equitable subordination.

asm causing a considerable increase in concern among lenders about exposure
to liability.
Id., see also J. NORTON & W. BAGGETT, LENDER LIABILrry LAW AND LITIGATION (1990)
(describing numerous theories under which lenders may be held liable for borrowers' conduct); A.J. Herbert III, Comment, Lender Liability: Good Faith and Demand Notes, 64
TUL. L. REv. 187, 198 (1989) (noting that "the floodgates of lender liability litigation burst
wide open" in 1984); Todd C. Pearson, Note, Limiting Lender Liability: The Trend Toward
Written Credit Agreement Statutes, 76 MINN. L. REV. 295, 299 (1991) (describing legislatures' recognition of the destructive increase in lender liability).
235. Helen D. Chaitman, The Ten Commandments for Avoiding Lender Liability, in
LENDER LIABrLiTY LITIGATION: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS (PLI Comm'l L. & P No. 511) 9
(1989).
236. The commandments are:
I. Thou Shalt Not Make A Sudden Move
II. Thou Shalt Not Tell A Lie
I. Thou Shalt Honor Thy Commitments
IV Thou Shalt Not Run Thy Borrower's Business
V Thou Shalt Not Bail Thyself Out on Thy Brother's Money
VI. Thou Shalt Keep Thine Own Files Clean
VII. Thou Shalt Transfer A Troubled Loan to a Workout Officer
VIII. Thou Shalt Confer With Workout Counsel
IX. Thou Shalt Think Carefully Before Suing on a Deficiency
X. Thou Shalt Not Be Arrogant
Id. at 11.
Helen Chaitman has also provided avoidance techniques to assist lenders in avoiding equitable subordination. See generally Chaitman, supra note 235. The value of this guidance,
rooted in avoiding control or participating in misconduct, will be dismissed if "fairness"
becomes grounds for subordination. Chaitman has recognized that the possible impact of
Virtual Network is uncertain.
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The danger of undefined power is that lenders cannot determine
what the court considers "proper conduct" until the court acts.
When the court acts adversely to a lender's reasonable expectations, the results can be devastating. Lenders have the right to
know what is required of them in order to maintain the priority
that is crucial to their business.37
The courts have sufficient options under the Mobile Steel framework without resorting to unprincipled, unpredictable jurisprudence.238 If the judiciary's goal is to demand specific types of actions and conduct from lenders, it can explicitly label certain types
of conduct as "improper." Lenders would then know prospectively
what the law required of them. By lowering the threshold of inequitable conduct to the level that would encompass "arrogance," obviously the courts would throw the financial community into turmoil. The reality, of course, is that judges will not explicitly label
this conduct "inequitable."
CONCLUSION

Courts should provide the financial community with specific definitions and guidelines to establish the necessary stability Allowing courts to subordinate claims without adhering to principled
methods for determining inequitable conduct opens the door for
subordination for reasons that do not warrant the use of this drastic remedy Lenders need stability to eliminate the risks of bankruptcy; this is the precise reason that bankruptcy legislation exists.
It has taken four decades to establish practical guidelines that will
assist creditors in assessing the risk of entering into a venture.
Virtual Network opens a door that will allow chaos into this
fragile world. The Seventh Circuit's results-oriented jurisprudence,
based upon ambiguous legislative history, provides courts with
near plenary discretion to subordinate on personal notions of jus237. See Pearson, supra note 234, at 300 ("The highly unpredictable nature of lender
liability law interferes with the lenders' important economic role. Without lending, [economic] growth would be impossible.").

238. Under Mobile Steel, a court cannot subordinate a claim unless the claimant has acted inequitably, the misconduct has injured other creditors or given the claimant an unfair
advantage, and the subordination is not inconsistent with the Bankruptcy Code. Benjamin
v. Diamond (In re Mobile Steel Co.), 563 F.2d 692, 700 (5th Cir. 1977); see supra notes 7378 and accompanying text.
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tice. The return to the nebulous concept of "justice" that pervaded
bankruptcy law before Mobile Steel is a dangerous course for the
courts to take.
Other circuits adjudicating cases involving reorganizations under
Chapters 9, 11, and 13 should reject any continuation of this haphazard trend. If Virtual Network is limited to its precise facts, the
impact of its holding may be restricted. Even if the policy of protecting innocent creditors justifies subordination of government
claims in which no misconduct exists, the same policy does not justify the use of no fault subordination when a nonpenalty claim is
at issue. As Judge Easterbrook stated, "Risk must be assessed ex
39
ante by lenders, rather than ex post by judges.M
Scott M. Browning

239. Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc., v. First Bank of Whiting, 908 F.2d 1351, 1358 (7th
Cir. 1990).

